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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Cody Parmer appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to 
disrr.iss his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In a prior criminal case, the state charged 20-year-old Parmer with raping 
17-year old S.H. under the alternative theories of statutory and forceable rape, 
and with battery with the intent to commit rape. (#39203 R., pp.60-62. 1) 
At the time Parmer was charged, I. C. § 18-6101 ( 1) defined statutory rape 
as sexual penetration occurring "[w]here the female is under the age of eighteen 
(18) years." I.C. § 18-6101 (1) (2009). Prior to Parmer's trial, however, the 
legislature amended LC. § 18-6101 to re-define statutory rape sexual penetration 
occurring either: (1) "[w]here the female is under the age of sixteen (16) years 
and the perpetrator is eighteen years of age or older" or (2) "[w]here the female is 
sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age and the perpetrator is three (3) years 
or more older than the female." Idaho S.L. 2010, ch. 352, § 1, eff. July 1, 201 O; 
I.C. § 18-6101 (1 ), (2). 
Prior to trial, Parmer moved for the dismissal of the rape charge as to the 
statutory rape theory on the grounds that his alleged conduct no longer 
1 In an order dated October 29, 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court severed the 
present appeal (Case No. 41222), from Case No. 41434. In the same order the 
Court took judicial notice, in Case No. 41434, of the clerk's record and reporter's 
transcript from Parmer's prior appeal, Case No. 39203. Contemporaneously with 
the filing of this brief, the state files a motion for the Court to also take judicial 
notice, in Case No. 41222, of the clerk's record and reporter's transcript from 
Case No. 39203. 
1 
constituted statutory rape under Idaho law. 2 (#39203 R., pp.76-78.) In denying 
the motion, the district court primarily relied on LC.§ 67-513, which provides that 
the repeal of a criminal law does not constitute a bar to the prosecution and 
punishment of an act committed in violation of the law while it was still in effect, 
unless a contrary intention is expressly declared in the repealing act. (#39203 
R., pp.153-159.) 
After a trial, the jury acquitted Parmer of rape, but found him guilty of 
battery with the intent to commit rape. (#39203 R., pp.249-250.) Parmer then 
filed a motion for a new trial asserting that the jury instructions were erroneous 
because they permitted the jury to find that Parmer was guilty of battery with 
intent to commit statutory rape. (#39203 R., pp.265-271.) This instruction was 
erroneous, Parmer asserted, because battery with intent to commit statutory rape 
is an invalid legal theory, in that statutory rape, unlike forceable rape, does not 
include battery as a "manner and means" by which one commits the crime. (Id.) 
The district court denied the motion. (#39203 R., pp.287-296.) 
The district court imposed a unified term of fifteen years with six years 
fixed but suspended the sentence and retained jurisdiction. (#39203 R., pp.302-
304.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed 
Parmer on probation. See See State v. Parmer, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 
665, Docket No. 39203, p.2 (Idaho App., September 17, 2013). 
Parmer filed a direct appeal of his conviction, but did not raise issues 
relating to the legislature's amendment of I.C. § 18-6101, or to the jury 
2 Parmer is 2 years, 7 months, and 19 days older than S.H. (See #39203 R., 
p.77.) 
2 
instructions. Parmer 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 665. Instead, Parmer 
asserted only that the prosecutor committed misconduct kl The Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed Parmer's conviction .3 kl 
!n 2012, the state charged Parmer with failure to register as a sex offender 
for failing to provide written notice of a change of address. (R., pp.25-26.) 
Parmer filed a motion to dismiss the charge, asserting, among other grounds, 
that he had no duty to register as a sex offender because his underlying crimina,I 
conviction for battery with intent to rape was invalid. (R., pp.34-40.) Specifically, 
Parmer asserted again that the legislature's amendment to I.C. § 18-6101, which 
redefined statutory rape, precluded his conviction for battery with intent to commit 
rape. (!d.) The district court denied Parmer's motion. (R., pp.53-55, 59-60.) 
Parmer then entered a conditional guilty plea to failure to register as a sex 
offender, preserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to 
dismiss. (R., pp.56-58, 61-63, 66.) The district court imposed a unified five-year 
sentence with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.70-72.) Parmer timely appealed. (R., pp.73-76.) 
3 The Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion affirming Palmer's conviction for battery 
with intent to commit rape was filed after Parmer was sentenced for failure to 
register as a sex offender. 
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Parmer's 
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
ISSUES 
court abuse its 
to dismiss? 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
when it 
Has Parmer failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss? 
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ARGUMENT 
Parmer Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To 
Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Parmer contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss his charge of failing to register as a sex offender. (See generally. 
Appellant's brief.) Specifically, he contends that the battery with intent to commit 
rape conviction underlying his registration requirement is invalid, and he 
therefore had no duty to register as a sex offender as a matter of law. (Id.) 
Parmer's contention fails because he has not established either a basis for 
expungement of his duty to register as a sex offender, or that his underlying 
conviction for battery with intent to commit rape is invalid. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law and the 
application and construction of statutes. State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 803, 
172 P.3d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 
121,122 (1990). 
C. Parmer's Conviction For Battery With The Intent To Commit Rape 
Required Him To Register As A Sex Offender 
tdaho Code § 18-8304 of the Sexual Offender Registration Notification 
and Community Right-To-Know Act compels individuals who have been 
convicted of certain enumerated crimes to register as sex offenders. Included 
5 
within this list of crimes is I.C. § 18-911, battery with intent to commit rape, 
infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct. l.C. § 18-8304. 
In denying Parmer's motion to dismiss, the district court correctly 
concluded that because Parmer had been convicted of battery with intent to 
commit rape, he was required to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.53-55, 59-
60.) 
The district court's decision was correct for several reasons. First, the 
Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-To-Know Act 
does not provide any grounds for relief from the sex offender registration 
requirements that are applicable to Parmer. Second, Parmer is not permitted to 
collaterally attack his battery with intent to commit rape conviction that was the 
basis of his duty to register as a sex offender. Third, even if Parmer were 
permitted to collaterally attack his battery with intent to commit rape conviction, 
he cannot show that the conviction is somehow invalid. 
Neither the Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community 
Right-To-Know Act itself, nor any other authority cited by Parmer, permit him to 
collaterally attack his battery with intent to commit rape conviction in the context 
of his subsequent failure to register as a sex offender case. The Sexual Offender 
Registration Notification and Community Right-To-Know Act, I.C. §§ 18-8301 to 
18-8331, provides only two express means by which an offender may be 
relieved of his duty to register as a sex offender. Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8310, 
offenders who are not recidivists, have not been convicted of aggravated 
offenses, and have not been designated as violent sexual predators, may, after 
6 
ten years from the date the offender was released from incarceration, petition to 
the court to be exempted from further registration. Pursuant to LC.§ 18-8310A 
offenders convicted of statutory rape for conduct that would no longer constitute 
statutory rape foilowlng the 2010 legislative amendment to I.C. § 18-6101 may, in 
some circumstances, petition the court to be exempted from further registration. 4 
"Only compliance with l.C. § 18-8310 releases a defendant from the reporting 
requirements of the registration act, and to decide differently would "contravene 
the express language of LC.§ 18-8304(3)." State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 
309-310, 142 P.3d 729, 722-723 (2006) (citing State v. Perkins, 135 Idaho 17, 21, 
13 P.3d 344, 344 (Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting Robinson's argument that the district 
court's dismissal of his underlying sex offense conviction pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604(1) relieved him of his duty to register as a sex offender). 
While the Idaho appellate courts have not specifically addressed whether 
individuals may collaterally attack prior sex offense convictions in order to 
challenge their sex offender registration requirement, the United States Supreme 
Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have precluded collateral attacks in similar 
contexts. In Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994), the United States 
Supreme Court held that a defendant's due process right to collaterally attack a 
4 The opportunity for exemption provided by Idaho Code § 18-831 0A was 
formerly codified as I.C. § 18-8304(4) (2009). In his motion to dismiss his failure 
to register charge, Parmer argued that I.C. § 18-8304(4) applied to offenders 
convicted of battery with intent to commit rape where statutory rape is one of the 
alternative theories of the rape charge. (R., pp.38-40.) Parmer has not pursued 
this argument on appeal. In any event, the state submits that a plain language 
reading of I.C. § 18-8310A and the former I.C. § 18-8304(4), which both 
reference only rape, preclude an application of that statute to a conviction for 
battery with intent to commit rape, a crime which is not referenced in either 
statute. 
7 
conviction used for enhancement purposes in a subsequent proceeding is limited 
to the singular constitutional defect of failure to appoint counsel. lct..c at 496. In 
State v. \/Varren 135 Idaho 836, 840-841, 25 P.3d 859, 863-864 (Ct. App. 2001) 
and State v. VVeber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 414 (2004) the Idaho appellate courts 
adopted the Custis holding. 
The reasoning behind Custis, Warren, and Weber applies to the present 
case. In adopting Custis, the Idaho Court of Appeals referenced the policy 
concerns expressed by the United States Supreme Court and recognized that 
determination of collateral attacks on prior convictions would require courts to 
"rummage through frequently nonexistent or difficult to obtain state court 
transcripts or records that may date from another era, and may come from any 
one of the 50 States." Warren, 135 Idaho at 841, 25 P.3d at 864. Additionally, 
the Court reasoned: 
The interest in promoting the finality of judgments provides 
additional support for our constitutional conclusion. As we have 
explained, "[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine 
confidence in the integrity of our procedures" and inevitably delay 
and impair the orderly administration of justice. (Citations omitted). 
By challenging the previous conviction, the defendant is asking a 
district court "to deprive [the] [state court judgment] of [its] normal 
force and effect in a proceeding that ha[s] an independent purpose 
other than to overturn the prior judgmen[t]." (Citation omitted). 
Likewise, permitting offenders to collaterally attack the underlying sex 
offense that brought about the registration duty would be unreasonably 
burdensome. Such attacks on convictions are better suited for direct appeals, 
particularly in this case, where the direct appeal of Parmer's battery with intent to 
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commit rape conviction was stiil pending whi!e Parmer was attempting to 
collaterally attack the same conviction in the context of his failure to register 
case. Parmer could have chosen to raise grounds re,ated to the legislative 
amendment of LC.§ 18-6101 on direct appeal of his battery with intent to commit 
rape conviction. 
Further, even if Parmer were permitted to attempt to collaterally attack his 
battery with intent to commit rape conviction in the context of his subsequent 
failure to register charge, he cannot show that the underlying conviction was 
somehow invalid. LC. § 67-513 provides that "the repeal of any law creating a 
criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the prosecution and punishment of 
an act already committed in violation of the law so repealed, unless the intention 
to bar such prosecution and punishment is expressly declared in the repealing 
act" The 2010 legislative amendment to I.C. § 18-6101 contains no language 
barring such prosecutions and punishments. Therefore, even if the jury in the 
underlying case found that Parmer committed battery with intent to commit 
statutory rape, the conviction is still valid because the charged conduct 
constituted statutory rape at the time Parmer committed the act 
Parmer has failed to establish either any basis for an expungement of his 
requirement to register as a sex offender, or that his underlying conviction for 
battery with intent to commit rape is invalid. He has therefore failed to show that 
the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his charge for failure to 
register as a sex offender. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Parmer's motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2014. 
MARK VV. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of January, 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
BEN PATRICK McGREEVY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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